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ARE THERE ANY CHECKS AND BALANCES ON THE 
GOVERNMENT'S POWER TO CHECK OUR BALANCES? 
THE FATE OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 
by ERIC J. GOUVIN* 
In the three years since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the laws 
affecting money laundering and financial privacy in the United States have been 
changed to give law enforcement agencies easier access to financial information. 
Although the changes to the law were passed with the claim that they were needed 
to intercept terrorist financing, the anti-money laundering provisions enacted by the 
USA PATRIOT Act are being used routinely against non-terrorist criminal suspects 
as part of regular law enforcement processes. Although the apprehension of 
ordinary criminals by any means available will sound perfectly acceptable to many, 
it is at odds with our traditional approach to financial privacy. This paper 
concludes that Congress ought to revisit the money laundering regime to make sure 
it strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate desire for financial privacy 
and the legitimate need for law enforcement access to suspicious accounts. After 
review, lawmakers may find that procedural adjustments to provide protection from 
law enforcement abuse of the system are called for. 
INTRODUCTION 
"See, 9/11 changed everything."l 
The events of September 11, 2001 brought about many changes in both 
domestic and foreign policy. Among other things; they changed the official 
American approach to anti-money laundering regulation. While historically our 
anti-money laundering laws had been geared primarily toward tracing the proceeds 
of crime, after September 11th, government officials began touting anti-money 
laundering rules as an effective technique for intercepting terrorist financing in 
order to prevent criminal acts from happening in the first place. 
Using the war against terror as a justification, the changes in anti-money 
laundering law came in rapid succession in the fall of 2001.2 Within two weeks of 
* Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Western New England College School of 
Law, Springfield, Massachusetts. 
1. George W. Bush, "President Bush and Prime Minister Allawi Press Conference," Sept. 23, 
2004, available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2004/09/20040923-8.html. 
2. See Michael P. Malloy, Commentary, Panel One: Un funding Terror-Perspectives on 
Un funding Terror, 17 l'RANSNAT'L L. 97 (2004) (summarizing the major changes implemented in the 
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the terrorist attacks, President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 freezing the 
assets of, and prohibiting transactions with, persons who commit, threaten to 
commit, or support terrorism.3 Two weeks later, the G-8 finance ministers agreed 
to pursue a comprehensive strategy to disrupt terrorist financing4 and by October 6, 
2001, had implemented an action plan to do SO.5 By the end of October, the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international intergovernmental anti-
money laundering body, started developing guidance for financial institutions 
aimed at detecting the techniques and mechanisms of terrorist financing.6 
Stateside, on October 26, 2001, less than six weeks after the September 11th 
attacks, President Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act7 (the "Patriot 
Act"), which included, within its 342 pages, Title III-the International Money 
Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001.8 At the time of 
the law's passage, legislators across the political spectrum, from Rep. Bob Barr on 
the right to Rep. Barney Frank on the left, warned of the Patriot Act's potential for 
loss of privacy.9 Nevertheless, in the heat of the moment, the massive bill was 
adopted with very little opposition. 
With the perspective gained during the three years since its enactment, policy 
analysts now have the opportunity to examine the Patriot Act without the 
September 11th attacks as the immediate emotional backdrop. By any fair 
measure, the Patriot Act brought about dramatic changes in the law. Although 
wake of the September 11 th attacks). 
3. Exec. Order No. 13,224,66 Fed. Reg. 49, 079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (hereinafter E.O. 13224). The 
order was extraordinary in its scope in a couple of ways. It froze assets and prohibited transactions with 
a poorly defined group of persons who are "otherwise associated" with any designated terrorist. Id. at 
Sec. 1 (d)(iii). In addition, the White House maintained that the order gave the Treasury Department the 
power to "block the U.S. assets of, and deny access to U.S. markets to, foreign banks who refuse to 
freeze terrorist assets." The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Executive Order on 
Terrorist Financing, Sept. 24, 2001, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesI200l/09/20010924-2.html. 
4. Statement of G7 Ministers of Finance September 25, 2001, available at 
http://www.g8.utoronto.calfinancelfmOl0925.htm. 
5. Statement ofG7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors October 6,2001, available at 
http://www.g8.utoronto.calfinancelfml00601.htm. 
6. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.orgldataoecdl55/16/34266142.pdf. 
7. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, U5 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USAPAj 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18, and 31 USC). 
8. See Paul Schott Stevens & Thomas C. Bogle, Patriotic Acts: Financial Institutions, Money 
Laundering and the War Against Terrorism, 21 ANN. REv. OF BANKING L. 261 (2002); Todd Stern, et 
aI., The Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, 119 BANKING LJ. 1 
(2001) (summarizing the provisions in Title ill of the USAPA). 
9. Amy Borus, When Right and Left See Eye-to-Eye, Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 88 (noting that 
the opponents of the Patriot Act included ultra-conservative Rep. Bob Barr and ultra-liberal Rep. Barney 
Frank). An editorial column in Investor's Business Daily, a fairly conservative newspaper, stated one 
conservative critique of. the Patriot Act this way: "Congress and the Bush administration, rather than 
concentrating on al-Qaida, enacted a laundry list of proposals to empower government bureaucrats to 
surveil on and punish citizens and businesses that pose no threat to national security." James Bovard, 
Viewpoint: Americans' Financial Liberty Placed at Risk by Patriot Act, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct. 8, 
2003, at A16. 
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many commentators have concluded that the Patriot Act goes too far, during the 
2004 presidential campaign pointing out problems with the law during the 2004 
presidential campaign seemed to be considered by some an act akin to treason. IO 
Now that the election is behind us, the time may be at hand to re-evaluate this 
hastily-enacted legislation in light of our traditional values of financial privacy and 
limited government intrusion into personal business. IJ After a full public 
discussion, we may decide that the Patriot Act tipped the balance in favor of law 
enforcement agencies in a way that we have not considered prudent in the past. 
The first part of this article sketches out the tension between financial privacy 
and the need for law enforcement access to private financial information that 
existed prior to the passage of the Patriot Act. The second part describes how the 
Patriot Act changed the law of financial privacy. The third part discusses how the 
expanded law has actually been used by law enforcement officials. The fourth part 
discusses various options for dealing with the Patriot Act's changes to financial 
privacy in order to bring the law more into line with traditional values in this area. 
I. FINANCIAL PRIV ACY LAW PRIOR TO THE PATRIOT ACT 
Over the past thirty years or so our policy makers have been trying to find the 
right balance between a financial institution customer's legitimate desire for 
financial privacy and law enforcement agencies' legitimate need for access to 
financial records. 12 In general, although there is no federally recognized 
"expectation of privacy" in bank records for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment,13 bank customers do in fact have a common law right to financial 
privacy implicit in the contract between the bank and its customer. 14 Historically, 
10. The rhetoric supporting the Patriot Act was often thick with jingoistic flourishes, making 
counter-arguments seem anti-patriotic by comparison. An excerpt from a guest editorial by John 
Ashcroft in the Wall Street Journal provides an example: 
The public has expressed overwhelming support for the Patriot Act in opinion poll after 
opinion poll. They know what the 9/11 Commission affirmed: that for the past three years, 
America's families and communities have been safer, and their freedom is enhanced because 
of the president's resolve and leadership, the foresight of Congress in enacting these vital 
tools, and the courageous men and women on the front lines who have used the Patriot Act to 
protect our lives and liberties. 
John Ashcroft, The Patriot Act: Wise Beyond Its Years, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26,2004, at A24. 
11. Again, the Wall Street Journal's editorial page provides a sign of the political possibilities. In a 
guest editorial published after the election and after Attorney General Ashcroft announced his 
resignation, former Republican congressman Bob Barr staked out a reasoned position for revising the 
Patriot Act. Bob Barr, Patriot Fixes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12,2004, at A12. 
12. See Oliver Ireland & Rachel Howell, The Fear Factor: Privacy, Fear, and the Changing 
Hegemony of the American People and the Right to Privacy, 29 N.C. J.INT'L L. & COM. REG. 671,673 
(2004) (providing an overview of the legislative enactments affecting the right to financial privacy). 
13. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976) (holding that respondent had no 
Fourth Amendment interest in bank records that were produced under subpoena). 
14. See, e.g., Milohnich v. First Nat'! Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1969) (holding that complaint was sufficient to state cause of action for breach by bank of implied 
contractual duty to corporate depositor by negligently, willfully, intentionally, or maliciously disclosing 
information concerning depositor's accounts to individual third parties); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l 
Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (holding that depositor who claimed bank disclosed his financial 
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bank customers have expected their bank records to be held in confidence. IS In 
1970, against this backdrop of the common law of financial privacy, Congress 
passed the law which became the cornerstone of our anti-money laundering policy, 
the "Bank Secrecy Act" ("BSA"). 16 
The BSA requires banks and other "financial institutions"l? to keep certain 
records and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require those institutions to 
report certain financial transactions. 18 The stated policy reason for the Bank 
Secrecy Act is: "Such records and reports are of a high degree of usefulness in 
criminal, tax, and other regulatory investigations.,,19 The regulations implementing 
the BSA originally required covered financial institutions to report each deposit, 
withdrawal, exchange of currency, or other payment or transfer which involved a 
transaction in currency of more that $10,000.20 
Shortly after its enactment, skeptics of the BSA's approach to anti-money 
laundering pointed out that it was relatively easy to evade the law since it only 
applied to transactions of $10,000 or more and did not cover all types of financial 
intermediaries.21 Indeed, in the thirty plus years since its implementation, policy 
makers have continually tinkered with the rules to try to address those 
shortcomings.22 At the time of its enactment, however, the most important 
objection to the BSA was that the law was inconsistent with bank customers' 
condition without consent had a claim based on breach of an implied contract that bank would not 
disclose infonnation concerning depositor's account to third parties unless authorized by law or 
depositor). 
15. In four special circumstances, however, the implied contract right of privacy is limited: (1) 
disclosure under compulsion of law; (2) disclosure pursuant to the public interest; (3) disclosure 
pursuant to the bank's interest; and (4) disclosure pursuant to the customer's express or implied consent. 
Milohnich, 224 So. 2d at 761. The common law of financial privacy does not apply to checks, since 
they are given to strangers and generally circulated, nor to bank records made by the bank for its own 
purposes. ALFRED M. POlLARD, BANKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES §5.2 (1992). In addition, there 
is authority for the proposition that a bank may have a duty to disclose otherwise confidential 
infonnation to a customer with which it has a fiduciary relationship. See Barnett Bank of W. Aa. v. 
Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Aa. 1986) (holding that a bank which enters into a transaction with "a 
customer with whom it has established a relationship of trust and confidence, and it is a transaction from 
which the bank is likely to benefit at the customer's expense" the bank could have assumed "a duty to 
disclose facts material to the transaction" that are not available to the customer); Catalina Yachts v. Old 
Colony Bank & Trust, 497 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (D. Mass. 1980) (holding that a bank cannot practice 
selective disclosure which is "designed to misrepresent the financial status of its customer"). 
16. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1829(b), 1951-1959 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002); 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5311-5322 
(West 2003). 
17. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2) (West 2003) (defining "financial institution"). 
18. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5313(a) (West 2003). 
19. 12 U.S.C.A. §J829(b)(a)(2); 31 U.S.C.A. § 5311 (West 2003). 
20. The regulations promulgated by the Department of Treasury under the Bank Secrecy Act are 
found at 31 CFR §103.11 (2004). Over the years they have been expanded to cover related transactions 
which in the aggregate exceed $10,000 and other situations to reduce the chance for evasion. 
21. Eric 1. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering and the 
War on Terrorism, 55 BAYWR L. REV. 955, 962-70 (2003) (providing a brief history and critique of 
U.S. anti-money laundering efforts). 
22. For example, banks are now required to institute compliance procedures to aggregate 
transactions under $10,000 in order to detect and prevent evasion of the BSA rules. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 
(West 2003). 
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expectations of privacy. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court, in a 
majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, declared that the BSA was 
constitutional because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
bank/customer relationship with regard to information required by the 
government. 23 In the delicate balance between financial privacy and the need for 
law enforcement agencies to obtain information, the Court tipped the scales in 
favor of law enforcement. 
As if to demonstrate that the American approach to financial privacy was a 
true balancing act, 1970 saw the passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA),24 which sought to safeguard consumer financial information. Congress' 
enactment of the FCRA was a response to the perception that some credit bureaus 
engaged in unfair practices in the collection and reporting of personal credit data 
and other information.25 The FCRA required credit bureaus to respond to consumer 
complaints and limited the availability of consumer credit reports only to specific 
"permissible purposes."26 So, while the BSA whittled away at personal financial 
privacy, the FCRA sought to protect it. This pattern of give-and-take in the area of 
financial privacy has played out ever since those important Acts were made law. 
The next important statute affecting financial privacy was the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act (the "Privacy Act"),27 passed in 1978. The Privacy Act was 
designed to counteract some of the invasive aspects of the BSA. Generally, the 
Privacy Act prohibits disclosure of a customer's individual28 financial records to a 
government authority without the customer's consent. 29 The Privacy Act provides 
broad coverage for financial privacy subject to many exceptions. While the 
23. California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 V.S. 21, 52-54 (1974) (holding that the Bank 
Secrecy Act's recordkeeping and reporting requirements do not deprive financial institutions of due 
process, nor does the implementation of the BSA constitute an illegal search and seizure in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment); Miller, 425 U.S. at 441-443 (1976) (holding that there is no Fourth 
Amendment expectation of privacy in a person's bank records when a government agency has an 
interest in examining those records). 
24. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1681-168lt (1970). 
25. Congress was aware of the impact of Miller and the Right to Financial Privacy Act was in part a 
response to that decision. H.R. REp. No. 95-1383, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 V.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 
9306. "In the celebrated Miller case, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment prohibitions 
against search and seizure did not protect bank records .... The Court did not however, rule out a 
legislative remedy to this very large hole in the constitutional privacy protections of individuals." 124 
CONGo REc. S37,570 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of M. Abourezk) (emphasis added). 
26. 15 V.S.C. § 1681b (defining the purpose of the subchapter as requiring consumer reporting 
agencies to "adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, 
personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, 
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in 
accordance with the requirements of this subchapter"). 
27. Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI §§ 1101-1121,92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §3401 -
3422). 
28. The law protects individuals and partnerships consisting of five or fewer individuals, but does 
not extend to corporations. 12 V.S.C.A. § 3401(4) (West 2001 & Supp. 2002). 
29. 12 V.S.C.A. § 3402(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2002). Among other exemptions found in section 
3413, the Act does not prohibit disclosure in the following situations: (1) where the financial 
information is not individually identifiable, § 3413(a); (2) where the financial institution itself is being 
investigated, § 3413(b); and (3) where the disclosure is in accordance with Internal Revenue Code 
provisions or other federal statutes or rules. §3413(c). 
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Privacy Act establishes that the government does not have unfettered access to 
customer bank accounts, it also provides that a customer may authorize disclosure 
to a government authority, subject to revocation.30 
Even with the protections contained in the Privacy Act, however, the 
government could obtain access to financial records without the customer's consent 
pursuant to an administrative subpoena, a judicial subpoena, a search warrant, and, 
in certain circumstances, a formal written request.3l Under the Privacy Act a 
customer is ordinarily entitled to notice before disclosure to a government 
authority,32 and has the right to challenge the disclosure.33 Although critics of the 
Patriot Act have complained about delayed notification of government action, it is 
worth noting that the Privacy Act provided for delayed notice to the customer 
pursuant to court order if giving notice would have resulted in the flight of the 
customer from prosecution, destruction of evidence, intimidation of potential 
witnesses, or the serious compromising of an investigation or proceeding.34 Even 
before the attacks of September 11 th, special procedures under the Privacy Act 
governed access to financial records in connection with certain intelligence 
activities.35 
Throughout the 1980s36 and 1990s,37 Congress made adjustments to the basic 
schemes of financial privacy and financial reporting, but the fundamental tension 
between the two regulatory schemes remained-some provisions pushed for greater 
privacy while others pushed for greater access by law enforcement officials. In 
1998, however, it seemed that the delicate balance between the two competing 
policies was in danger of being lost. Banking regulators attempted to push the 
balance in favor of government access to private financial information, with the so-
called "Know Your Customer" ("KYC") proposal, which would have required 
banks to closely monitor customer activity.38 Among other things, the 1998 KYC 
30. 12 V.S.C.A. § 3404(a)(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2002). 
31. § 3402(2)-(5). 
32. § 3408(4). 
33. § 341O(e). 
34. §§ 3409(a)(3)-(b)(3). 
35. § 3414. 
36. For example, in 1988 Congress passed the Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act. 
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4354 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 V.S.C.A.). The 
main thrust of this Act was to expand the reach of the BSA by broadening the definition of "financial 
institution." 31 V.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2)(2ool). 
37. In 1992, for instance, Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act. 102 
Pub. L. No. 550, 106 Stat. 3672 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, 31 and 42 
V.S.C.A.). This Act further bolstered the requirements of the BSA by requiring the filing of "Suspicious 
Activity Reports" (known in the industry as SARs) that were "relevant to a possible violation of law or 
regulation." 31 V.S.c.A. § 5318(g)(l) (West 2003). SARs were an attempt to fine tune the money 
laundering reporting system in light of the fact that a bright line dollar amount rule sometimes left 
suspicious transactions unreported. If a transaction is "suspicious" it must be reported. A transaction is 
considered suspicious if it involves an aggregate amount of $5000 or more. 31 C.F.R. § 103.18(a)(2) 
(2004). 
38. Membership of State Banking Institutions in the Federal Reserve System; International Banking 
Operations; Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,516 (Dec. 7,1998) 
(codified at 12 c.F.R. pts. 208, 211, 225); Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536 (Dec. 7, 1998) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 563); Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act 
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proposal would have required financial institutions to: (1) determine the customer's 
identity; (2) identify the source of customer funds; (3) determine the customer's 
"normal and expected" transactions; (4) monitor accounts for transactions that were 
not consistent with those expectations; and (5) determine whether such transactions 
were unusual or suspicious.39 In response to the proposed rules, the federal banking 
regulators received a flood of comment letters, the overwhelming majority of 
which opposed the rules.40 The proposed rules were withdrawn in March of 1999.41 
The political fallout from the over-reaching KYC proposal was quite 
significant. After the KYC debacle, Congress spent a great deal of time and effort 
bolstering the right of financial privacy. Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
199942 ("GLB Act") addressed several matters relating to the protection of 
nonpublic personal information of customers of financial service providers.43 The 
GLB Act mandated the issuance of comprehensive regulations to be promulgated 
by the federal banking regulators, the FfC and the SEC, in consultation with state 
insurance regulators, to protect the confidentiality and safeguard the security of the 
personal consumer information maintained by financial institutions.44 The GLB 
Act specifically permits customers of financial institutions to opt out of having 
their information shared with any unaffiliated third party.45 In addition, financial 
institutions are prohibited from disclosing certain types of information, such as 
account numbers and access codes, to unaffiliated parties in any event.46 As 
required by the law, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision jointly published final regulations to implement the privacy provisions 
contained in the GLB ActY 
Compliance, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,529 (Dec. 7,1998) (codified at 12 C.P.R. 326). 
39. Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536. 
40. The FDIC received 254,394 comments with the "overwhelming majority" strongly opposed to 
the proposed standards. Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 
64 Fed. Reg, 14,845 (Mar. 29, 1999) (codified at 12 c.P.R. pt. 326). 
41. Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 64 Fed. Reg, 
14,845. 
42. Gramm-Leach Bliley Financial Modernization Act (GLB Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16 and 18 U.S.c.). 
43. GLB Act §§ 501-510 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.c. §§ 6801-6809). 
44. GLB Act § 504. It is important to note that the GLB-mandated privacy provisions do not 
entirely preempt state privacy laws. Andrea Lee Negroni & John P. Kromer, Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Tip 
afthe Privacy Iceberg, 118 BANKING L.J. 958,959 (Nov. 2001). In many cases existing state privacy 
laws affecting financial institutions are more restrictive than the GLB provisions and may not be 
completely preempted by the GLB Act. Id. 
45. GLB Act § 502(a), (b). 
46. § 502(a), (b). 
47. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,162 (June 1,2000) (codified at 12 
C.P.R. pts. 40, 216, 332, 573). Among other things, the final regulations require financial institutions to: 
(1) provide customers with a notice of the institution's privacy policies and practices, with the initial 
disclosure for new customers being provided no later than when the customer relationship is established; 
(2) provide customers with the opportunity to opt out or bar the institution from sharing customer 
information with unaffiliated third parties unless the institution has a reasonable basis to believe that the 
information is lawfully publicly available from certain public sources; (3) refuse to disclose account 
information to third-party marketers unless it is an account to which no charge can be posted or the 
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The GLB Act's enhanced privacy provisions were the last installment in the 
back and forth struggle between privacy advocates and law enforcement advocates 
before the attacks of September 11 th precipitated the passage of the Patriot Act, 
with its major changes to U.S. money laundering law. That last installment clearly 
showed that financial privacy was the stronger value in the late 1990s and that 
politically it was an important issue. 
Then came September 11th, and everything changed. Law enforcement 
officials seized on anti-money laundering rules as valuable tools in terrorist 
investigations and sought to liberalize law enforcement access to financial 
records.48 It should be noted that although the anti-money laundering provisions of 
the Patriot Act appeared to be a response to the terrorist attacks, those provisions 
were not in fact new. The money laundering provisions that became Title III of the 
Patriot Act had been floating around Congress for several years prior to September 
11 tho Congress had even held hearings on various proposals to enhance money 
laundering rules, but, largely due to civil liberties concerns, it did not pass any new 
anti-money laundering legislation in the years immediately preceding the passage 
of the Patriot Act in 2001.49 It was not, however, for lack of trying. 
In the period 1998-2001 many proposals for enhanced money laundering 
efforts were made, but prior to September 11 th, proponents of tougher anti-money 
laundering legislation could not make the case for passage of those bills. A review 
of the Thomas website at the Library of Congress reveals that in the 105th Congress 
(1997-1998), the following bills were considered, although none of them were 
enacted into law: The Money Laundering Act of 1998,50 The Money Laundering 
Deterrence Act of 1998,51 and the Money Laundering Enforcement and Combating 
Drugs in Prisons Act of 1998.52 The 106th Congress (1999-2000) also saw a flurry 
of proposals for enhanced money-laundering rules, none of which were enacted 
into law. These included the Money Laundering Prevention Act of 1999,53 the 
account number is encrypted and the recipient does not have the decryption code; and (4) provide 
customers with privacy notices once every 12 months. 12 C.F.R. §§ 40.10, 40.40, 40.50 (2005); see 
Canning, Privacy: Banking Regulators Issue Final Privacy Rules with Delay, Spurring Lawmakers to 
Protest, 74 BANKING REp. (BNA) 857, 857 (May 15,2000) (describing privacy rules); Neil R. Pandozzi, 
Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts: Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the Constitutionality of Federal Financial 
Privacy Legislation, 55 U. MIAMI L. REv. 163, 190 (2001) (explaining the GLB Act's privacy 
provisions). 
48. Malloy, supra note 2, at 101. 
49. Jake Taper, Don't Blame it on Reno, SALON. com, (Jan 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.salon.com/politics/featurel2002l01/02/reno/index.htmI. 
50. Money Laundering Act of 1998, H.R. 3745, 105th Congo (1998). This bill died in committee. 
Bill Summary available at http://thomas.loc.gov (follow "Bill, Resolutions" hyperlink on the left, then 
follow "Search Bill Summary & Status" hyperlink in the middle of the page, then follow "Search 
Multiple Congresses" hyperlink on the upper right, then select box for "105th Congress" and enter the 
title of the bill into the search box). 
51. Money Laundering Deterrence Act of 1998, H.R. 4005, 105th Congo (1998). This bill passed 
the House and was received in the Senate, but did not go anywhere in the Senate. Bill Summary 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
52. Money Laundering Enforcement and Combating Drugs in Prisons Act of 1998, S. 2011, 105th 
Congo (1998). This bill died in committee. See Bill Summary, available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
53. Money Laundering Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1426/1471, 106th Congo (1999). These bills 
died in committee. See Bill Summary, available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
Spring 2005] FINANCIAL PRIV ACY IN WAR ON TERROR 525 
Foreign Money Laundering Deterrence and Anticorruption Act,54 the Money 
Laundering Abatement Act of 1999,55 the Integrity in Banking and Money 
Laundering Prevention Act of 1999,56 the Money Laundering Act of 2000,57 the 
International Counter-Money Laundering Act of 2000,58 and the International 
Counter-Money Laundering and Foreign Anticorruption Act of 2000.59 It is clear 
that in the years leading up to the September 11 th attacks, Congress was 
entertaining the idea of increased anti-money laundering rules, but did not yet have 
the political critical mass to pass an acceptable bill. 
In summary, prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, the U.S. anti-money 
laundering system worked on the assumption that the typical money laundering 
problem arose along the lines of the following scenario: a criminal either 
committed a crime and got a lot of money or dealt with other criminals and got a lot 
of money. The criminal then took that tainted money to a financial institution. The 
financial institution might consider the transaction with the customer noteworthy 
either because: (1) it exceeded the $10,000 transaction limit under the BSA; (2) it 
was part of a series of transactions structured in such a way as to avoid the $10,000 
BSA limit; or (3) it was over $5,000 and was "suspicious." If the transaction raised 
a red flag, the financial institution filed either a "currency transaction report" 
("CTR") or a "suspicious activity report" ("SAR") with the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), putting the law enforcement community on 
notice of a potentially noteworthy transaction that might deserve closer attention. 
Using data management techniques, FinCEN could then process this data to find 
patterns that would lead the law enforcement agencies to bring the criminals to 
justice and prevent them from committing any more crimes. 
In theory, the scheme described above makes sense and presents a coherent 
vision of how a sacrifice in financial privacy can result in a balancing benefit in 
more effective law enforcement. In practice, however, this one-way reporting 
system has not worked very well. Built-in incentives for financial institutions to 
54. Foreign Money Laundering Deterrence and Anticorruption Act, H.R. 2896/S. 1663, 106th 
Congo (1999). These bills died in committee. See bill summaries, available at http://thomas.!oc.gov. 
However, many of the provisions of the bill ultimately ended up in Title III of the Patriot Act; see 147 
CONGo REc. H7201 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (describing his prior 
legislation as giving the Secretary of the Treasury the power to "block transfers of funds into the United 
States financial system from foreign banking systems that are easily exploited by terrorists and criminal 
organizations because those foreign jurisdictions have weak or nonexistent anti-money laundering 
regimes"). 
55. Money Laundering Abatement Act of 1999, S. 1920, 106th Congo (1999). This bill died in 
committee. See Bill Summary, available at http://thomas.!oc.gov. 
56. Integrity in Banking and Money Laundering Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 2905, 106th Congo 
(1999). This bill died in committee. See Bill Summary, available at http://thomas.!oc.gov. 
57. Money Laundering Act of 2000, H.R. 465, 106th Congo (2000). This bill died in committee. 
See Bill Summary, available at http://thomas.!oc.gov. 
58. International Counter-Money Laundering Act of 2000, H.R. 3886, 106th Congo (2000). This 
bill was reported out of committee but no floor action was taken. See Bill Summary, available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov. 
59. International Counter-Money Laundering and Foreign Anticorruption Act of 2000, S. 2972, 
106th Congo (2000). This bill died in committee. See Bill Summary available at http://thomas.!oc.gov. 
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over-report transactions60 result in an incredible amount of information overload on 
the anti-money laundering system.61 Sifting through and making sense of all the 
financial data that comes to FinCEN is a Herculean task, and one which has not 
been successfully executed in the past. While it may be possible for FinCEN to 
rise to the challenge by employing state-of-the-art data mining techniques and 
predictive technology like that currently used in the private sector,62 much depends 
on whether FinCEN will have the personnel and resources to implement such a 
sophisticated arrangement.63 But all of that was before the Patriot Act changed the 
fundamental dynamic of the anti-money-Iaundering scheme. 
II. How THE PATRIOT ACT CHANGED THE LAW 
The money laundering provisions found in Title III of the Patriot Act changed 
our system of money laundering in a fundamental way. 64 Prior to the passage of 
60. The BSA imposes strict liability for failure to file appropriate reports. 31 U.S.c.A. § 
5321(a)(3)(2002). See U.S. v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844,855-57 (1st Cir. 1987) (ruling that 
the bank had the requisite mental state if it deliberately avoided learning CTR requirements). On the 
other hand, there is no liability attached to filing extraneous reports in good faith. See Lopez v. First 
Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., 129 F .3d 1186, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the good faith 
exception encourages financial institutions to playa role in combating money laundering); Brown v. 
Nationsbank Corp, 188 F. 3d 579, 589 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[iJf private businesses were not 
eligible for immunity from state law claims arising from assisting undercover federal operations, this 
would provide a major disincentive to assisting law enforcement and would undermine the needs and 
interests of the federal government"). Indeed, our money laundering law contains a provision holding 
reporting entities free from liability in connection with the filing of suspicious activity reports. 31 
U.S.C. §§ 5318(g)(3)(A) (2002) (Persons reporting suspicious activity "shall not be liable to any person 
under any law or regulation of the United States ... or of any State ... for such disclosure or for any 
failure to provide notice of such disclosure to the person who is the subject of such disclosure"); see 
Palmer Paxton Stoutt v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 320 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding 
summary judgment in favor of bank that filed SAR in connection with a customer who allegedly 
obtained funds under fraudulent pretenses on the grounds that the safe harbor of 31 U.S.c. § 5318(g)(3) 
protects the bank). The Patriot Act also gives reporting institutions the same protection. Patriot Act § 
351,31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(g)(3) (2002). 
61. FinCEN estimates that thirty-percent of the twelve million currency transaction reports it 
received in 2001 were filed unnecessarily. Rob Garver & Michele Heller, In Brief" FinCEN Seeks 
Streamlined Filing Process, AM. BANKER, Sept. 5,2002, at 3. According to a FinCEN press release: 
"These millions of excess forms have little value for law enforcement purposes and, we believe, impose 
substantial compliance costs upon financial institutions .... Also, excess filings burden our intelligence 
analysis and impede timely targeting of money laundering, terrorist financing, and other vulnerable 
transactions." Id. 
62. See Mike France, et aI., Privacy in An Age of Terror, Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 83, 84 
(outlining the technology available to help combat terrorist threats and the effect of those technologies 
on privacy). 
63. Industry observers are certainly skeptical that FinCEN will be able to process the data in real 
time to actually intercept terrorist acts, especially where on-line transactions are involved. See Steve 
Zelinger, Commentary, Panel One: Un funding Terror-Perspectives on Un funding Terror, 17 
TRANSNAT'L LAW 119, 123 (2003) (former Senior Counsel to Visa International expressing doubt that 
companies or the government have the technical capability to process the amount of data called for 
under the money laundering rules). 
64. For a tidy summary of the changes brought about by Title ill of the Patriot Act, see Malloy, 
supra note 2, at 101-9. 
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the Patriot Act, the money laundering laws focused primarily on tracing the 
proceeds of crime as criminals sought to make those ill-gotten gains look 
legitimate.65 After the Patriot Act the ostensible goal of the anti-money laundering 
statutes is to intercept the financing of criminal acts before they ever take place.66 
Post September 11th, our elaborate system of anti-money laundering provisions 
proceeds on the assumption that it is possible to prevent terrorist activities by 
"connecting the dots" in the financial transactions reported under our laws.67 
The biggest challenge confronting law enforcement officials as they try to 
connect the dots is knowing which dots are important enough to be connected. 
Under the pre-Patriot Act anti-money laundering rules, the law enforcement 
community had a flood of data and was trying to separate the important 
transactions from the noise. Prior experience with this approach showed that it did 
not always work well. When law enforcement officials try to find patterns in the 
flood of data that flows to FinCEN, they often end up with false positives. In two 
of the most notorious examples, radio personality Rush Limbaugh was investigated 
for money laundering in connection with his oxycontin addiction,68 while former 
Senator Bob Dole raised money laundering concerns in light of his personal 
predilection for carrying around large wads of cash.69 
Of course, it would be much easier for law enforcement officials to intercept 
crime if, instead of having to identify possible criminal suspects based on patterns 
in their financial dealings as reported under the BSA, they could tum the process 
around and start with a suspect and use the anti-money laundering system to see if 
the suspect has done anything wrong. This is what the Patriot Act allows law 
enforcement agencies to do. The Patriot Act permits the development of that 
strategy by virtue of three major changes in the regulatory scheme: (1) a dramatic 
expansion in the definition of "financial institution" under the BSA; (2) new 
"Know Your Customer" rules; and (3) the implementation of provisions requiring 
information sharing with law enforcement agencies and permitting information 
sharing among financial institutions. 
A. The Definition of "Financial Institution" 
The Patriot Act contains extensive provisions designed to improve the 
government's anti-money laundering efforts. One of the common criticisms of the 
Bank Secrecy Act was that it was relatively easy to evade because it did not apply 
to all financial intermediaries, or applied in different ways to different 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. See Jimmy Gurule, Commentary, Panel One: Unfunding Terror-Perspectives on Unfunding 
Terror, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1l3, 114 (2003) (fonner Undersecretary for Enforcement, U.S. 
Department of Treasury, stating that "with respect to the goal and purpose of the government's terrorist 
financial strategy, it is preventative in nature"). 
68. Mr. Limbaugh apparently was suspected of trying to avoid the BSA by structuring the 
withdrawals from his bank accounts to total less than $10,000 per transaction. CNN.com, Source: 
Limbaugh Investigated for Money Laundering, available at 
http://www.cnn.coml2003/SHOWBIZJI1I19Ilimbaugh.painkillers.ap/(lastvisitedDec.15. 2005). 
69. See Glenn R. Simpson, Bob Dole Goes Banking-and Trips the Alarm, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 
2004 at CI (discussing the problems surrounding the Riggs National Bank investigations). 
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intermediaries.70 SO, for example, because banks were subject to relatively strong 
reporting requirements, many suspicious transactions migrated to less regulated 
channels. Cash transfer services like MoneyGram and Western Union became a 
favorite tool of criminals.71 These networks could move cash very quickly and 
informally, with no need to set up an account and with minimal documentation 
requirements.72 The Patriot Act corrected this problem by extending the reach of 
the BSA to a wide array of financial intermediaries, including, among others, 
licensed senders of moneyJ3 The Act's expansion of the financial institution 
70. See Gouvin, supra note 21, at 964 (stating that not all financial intermediaries were subject to 
the BSA and that not all financial intermediaries were subject to the same requirements). 
71. See Heather Timmons, Terrorist Money by Wire, Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 94 (discussing the 
appeal of money transfer services to criminals due to the looser regulatory requirements for providers). 
72. See Heather Timmons, Western Union: Where the Money is-in Small Bills, Bus. WK., Nov. 
26, 2001, at 40-41 (discussing the speed and anonyniity with which criminals are able to utilize money 
transfer services). 
73. VSAPA § 321 (amending the existing definition of "financial institution"), 31 V.S.C.A. § 
5312(a)(2) (2002). Section 5312(a)(2) states: 
(2) "financial institution" means-
(A) an insured bank (as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 
V.S.C. 1813(h))); 
(8) a commercial bank or trust company; 
(C) a private banker; 
CD) an agency or branch of a foreign bank in the Vnited States; 
(E) any credit union; 
(F) a thrift institution; 
(G) a broker or dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 V.S.C. 78a et seq.); 
(H) a broker or dealer in securities or commodities; 
(I) an investment banker or investment company; 
(J) a currency exchange; . 
(K) an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks, money orders, or similar 
instruments; 
. (L) an operator of a credit card system; 
(M) an insurance company; 
(N) a dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels; 
(0) a pawnbroker; 
(P) a loan or finance company; 
(Q) a travel agency; 
(R) a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the 
transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in an informal money 
transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer 
of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions 
system; 
(S) a telegraph company; 
(T) a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and boat sales; 
(V) persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; 
(V) the Vnited States Postal Service; 
(W) an agency of the Vnited States Government or of a State or local government carrying 
out a duty or power of a business described in this paragraph; 
(X) a casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment with an annual gaming revenue of 
more than $1,000,000 which-
(i) is licensed as a casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment under the laws of any 
State or any political subdivision of any State; or 
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definition is an important innovation in anti-money laundering regulation. No 
longer can criminals get around the rules by using non-traditional channels. At the 
same time, law enforcement officials can gather a great deal of information on 
people through the wide range of enterprises which are now considered "financial 
institutions." The net is so broad, in fact, that law enforcement officials might 
easily put together quite a detailed profile of suspects based on information 
gathered through the various financial institutions that are now covered by the 
BSA. Combined with the two other provisions discussed below, this will prove to 
be part of an awesome investigatory power. 
B. New "Know Your Customer" Rules 
Another criticism of the pre-Patriot Act anti-money laundering regime was 
that the mechanical application of the statutory reporting rules resulted in many 
extraneous reports of very little value to the law enforcement community. 
Observers noted that the reporting system would produce more useful reports if the 
institutions generating the reports knew something about their customers' ordinary 
transactions in order to assess at the time of a reportable transaction whether the 
transaction was truly noteworthy or suspiciousJ4 This was the impetus behind the 
"Know Your Customer" proposal of 1998--essentially it was a bid to enlist 
financial intermediaries as spies for the government. The Patriot Act revisits the 
"Know Your Customer" idea, albeit in a somewhat watered-down form. 
The Patriot Act directs the Secretary of Treasury to promulgate regulations 
establishing standards for financial institutions regarding the identity of customers 
opening accounts. 75 The regulations implementing the Patriot Act require, among 
other things, that financial institutions implement reasonable procedures for: (1) 
verifying the identity of any person seeking to open an account, to the extent 
reasonable and practicable; (2) maintaining records of the information used to 
verify the person's identity, including name, address, and other identifying 
information; and (3) determining whether the person appears on any lists of known 
or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to the financial institution 
(ii) is an Indian gaming operation conducted under or pursuant to the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act other than an operation which is limited to class I gaming (as defined in 
section 4(6) of such Act); 
(Y) any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary of the 
Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a 
substitute for any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is authorized to 
engage; or 
(Z) any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash transactions have a high 
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters. 
31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2). 
74. See Gouvin, supra note 21, at 963-64 (describing "smurfing," an activity where large sums of 
money are deposited in smaller increments, which "led to a change in money laundering regulation 
designed to make bankers detect "suspicious" activities"). 
75. USAPA § 326(a), 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(1); Procedures for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act 
compliance, 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2004); Customer Identification Programs for Certain Banks, Savings 
Associations, Credit Unions, and Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 31 C.F.R. §103.121(a)(2) 
(2004). 
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by any government agency.76 
This represents a significant departure from previous law. Prior to the Patriot 
Act, banks were required to know their customer in only three specific situations: 
(1) to "verify and record the name and address of the individual presenting a 
transaction" when a CTR filing was required;77 (2) when customers purchased 
certain monetary instruments, such as cashier's checks and money orders;78 and (3) 
in certain wire transfers.79 Now presumably every customer is subject to the rules. 
The expansion of the definition of "financial institution" together with the new 
Know Your Customer rules have tightened up the existing anti-money laundering 
scheme in ways that critics had been calling for for years. Those two changes make 
the system more difficult to evade and put financial institutions in a better position 
to assess when activity is "suspicious" enough to warrant a Suspicious Activity 
Report. These two changes would have gone a long way toward improving the 
anti-money laundering regime to make it more inclusive and to provide more useful 
information for law enforcement agencies without changing the underlying 
dynamic of the information flow. The third major change discussed below, 
together with the two already discussed, however, has the potential to change the 
entire dynamic of the anti-money laundering scheme. 
C. Information Sharing Provisions 
From the standpoint of financial privacy, the most powerful innovations in the 
Patriot Act are those provisions designed to encourage, or in some cases compel, 
the sharing of information among financial institutions, regulators and law 
enforcement authorities.80 Section 314(a) of the Patriot Act allows law 
enforcement agencies, acting through FinCEN, to gather information about the 
various financial arrangements of a person being investigated.81 Under the 
regulations implementing section 314, a federal law enforcement agency 
investigating either terrorist activity or money laundering may request that FinCEN 
provide certain financial information from a financial institution or group of 
financial institutions.82 FinCEN, in turn, can require financial institutions to search 
their records to ascertain whether they maintain or have maintained accounts for, or 
conducted transactions with, the individual or entity specified.83 The records 
requested might not have been problematic under existing anti-money laundering 
76. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(1). 
77. 31 C.F.R. § 103.28 (2001). 
78. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5325(a) (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 103.29 (2001). 
79. 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e)-(f) (2001). 
80. USAPA § 356(b); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.90-110 (2004). 
81. 31 C.F.R. § 103.1oo(b) (2004). 
82. 31 C.F.R. § 103.100(b)(2004). While section 314 of the Patriot Act did not define "financial 
institution," the implementing regulations define "financial institution" for purposes of section 314 as 
any financial institution described in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2) that is required under 31 CPR part 103 to 
establish and maintain an anti-money laundering program. 31 C.P.R. § 103.l1O(a)(2). 
83. According to FinCEN, the section 314 request process allows law enforcement agencies to 
"reach out to 33,884 points of contact at more than 25,000 financial institutions to locate accounts and 
transactions .... " Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN's 314(a) Fact Sheet, Dec. 21, 2004, 
available at http://www.fincen.gov/314afactsheetl221 04. pdf. 
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rules-they could just be garden variety accounts. 
The procedural safeguards for these inquiries are very modest. There is no 
requirement that the requesting agency have a search warrant, or a grand jury 
subpoena, or even an administrative subpoena. In short, there is no meaningful 
checking mechanism to prevent the abuse of the 314(a) power. All that the agency 
requesting the information needs to supply is identification information for the 
customer being searched, and a certification that the subject of the request is 
"engaged in, or is reasonably suspected based on credible evidence of engaging in, 
terrorist or money laundering" activity.84 While this sounds fine in the abstract, the 
concern comes in the execution.85 
The section 314(a) mechanism works in the following way. Once it receives a 
request from FinCEN, a financial institution must "expeditiously" search its records 
for information relating to every individual, entity, or organization named in the 
request.86 If a financial institution does have a record of dealing with the subject of 
the inquiry, it must report back to FinCEN the following information: the name or 
account number of each individual or entity for which a match is found and a social 
security number and date of birth, or other similar identifying information that was 
provided by the subject of the information when the account was opened or the 
84. 31 c.F.R. §103.100(b) (2004). 
85. How the law enforcement community defines "credible evidence" is entirely within their 
discretion. A brief excerpt from the popular radio program A Prairie Home Companion illustrates the 
problem of over-zealous law enforcement agents seeing terrorists under every rock. In the skit, 
Detective Guy Noir (indicated in the script by the initials GK) is being interrogated by Harriet Hammer, 
an agent of the Homeland Security Department (indicated in the script by the initials SS). Agent 
Hammer is describing to Mr. Noir an important indicator of terrorist propensities: 
SS:We have a program called Eccentric Lawn Care Advisory, or ELCA. We keep track of 
people who aren't raking their leaves or cleaning their gutters or covering their flowers. 
Those things fit a terrorist profile. 
GK: Terrorists? 
SS: If they're not doing their yardwork, then what are they doing? They could be online, 
conspiring with other members of their sleeper cell, planning a shoe attack. 
GK: What's that? 
SS: Shoe bombs. Exploding sneakers. We've got an orange alert right now on older women 
with binoculars who are wearing oxfords. 
GK: Those are birdwatchers. 
SS: Could be, or they could be planning something involving the use of chickadees with 
explosives strapped to them. Anyway, poor lawn care is an important indicator. Anytime we 
find people with Scandinavian last names who aren't blowing the leaves off their driveways, 
we put them under surveillance. 
GK: That's ethnic profiling. 
SS: All I know is that when we see a lawn that's full of leaves and the last name ends in -son 
or -sen or -Quist or -rud or -strom, we have reason to believe they are sowing the seeds of 
hatred and trying to destroy democratic institutions. 
GK: And? 
SS: We pick em up. We bring em in. 
A PRAIRIE HOME COMPANION wrrH GARRISON KEILWR, GUY NOIR (Oct. 16, 2004). A complete 
transcript is available at http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/programs!2004/10/16/scripts/noir.shtml (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2005). 
86. 31 c.F.R. § 103.100 (b)(2)(i) (2004). 
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transaction conducted.87 Financial institutions of which FinCEN makes 
information requests may not disclose the fact that FinCEN has requested or 
obtained information under section 314(a) to anyone, other than to FinCEN or the 
requesting agency, except when such disclosure is necessary to comply with the 
request.88 The Treasury Department takes the position that the information 
received from a financial institution under section 314(a) is information required to 
be reported in accordance with a federal statute or rule, and therefore is not barred 
under section 3413(d) of the RFPA89 or section 502(e)(8) of the GLB Act.90 
While the actual data provided under section 314 can be quite mundane and 
unexciting, the section 314 request mechanism that allows law enforcement 
agencies to narrow the field of potential financial institutions is quite dramatic. 
Instead of relying on reported transactions to raise suspicions about the activities of 
specific people, the regulations implementing section 314 allow FinCEN to request 
transaction information about an individual it considers suspicious regardless of 
any activities that person may have engaged in. Under the new approach, it is 
unlikely that transactions reported under the BSA will make the law enforcement 
agencies suspicious, but rather, it is suspicion that will lead law enforcement to 
want to examine the bank records. This turns our traditional system on its head. 
The money laundering information flow has now become a two-way street. 
Unlike the pre-Patriot Act days where the information flowed in only one 
direction-from financial institutions to FinCEN-now the information can flow 
from FinCEN to the financial institutions as well. Prior to the development of 
section 314, law enforcement could look at the bank records of suspicious 
individuals only after establishing some plausible reason to suspect that individual 
was involved in criminal activity. Having identified the individual, the law 
enforcement authorities could then proceed to subpoena the individual's financial 
institutions-if it could figure out which institutions were worth subpoenaing. 
Now, however, life is much simpler for the law enforcement side, as they can query 
all financial institutions through section 314. 
The changes wrought by the Patriot Act have fundamentally altered the 
balance between privacy interests and law enforcement interests. In the words of 
Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff in testimony before the Senate 
Banking Committee: "the principal provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
no longer apply to letter requests by a government authority authorized to conduct 
investigations or intelligence analysis for purposes related to international 
terrorism."91 As Mr. Chertoff understands the Patriot Act, law-enforcement 
officials investigating terrorist activities no longer even have to file a subpoena 
when requesting bank records.92 
87. 31 C.F.R. § 103.100(b)(2)(ii) (2004). 
88. 31 c.P.R. §103.100(b)(2)(iv)(B)(l) (2004). 
89. 12 U.S.c. § 3413(d) (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 103.l00(b)(2)(v)(3) (2004). 
90. 15 U.S.c. § 6802(e)(8) (2000). 
91. Rob Garver, Will USA Patriot Act Prove A Recipe for Trouble?, AM. BANKER, Apr. 23, 2002, 
at 10; The Financial War on Terrorism and the Administration's Implementation of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 107th Congo (2002) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General). 
92. Id. 
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In addition to the "two way street" aspect of section 314(a), section 314 (b) 
provides a safe harbor from liability for violation of financial privacy protections in 
order to permit information sharing among financial institutions. In order to take 
advantage of the safe harbor provisions, institutions must give an annual notice to 
FinCEN prior to sharing.93 The safe harbor protection provided by section 314(b) 
applies only to the sharing of information related to terrorist or money laundering 
activity.94 Sharing information regarding overdrafts, failure to pay child support, 
unemployment, bankruptcy, etc., is not covered by section 314(b) and should not 
be shared by financial institutions. Nevertheless, observers worry that increased 
exchanges among institutions along with the use of sophisticated profiling 
programs will further erode financial privacy.95 
Some banking observers suggest that bankers will feel pressure to voluntarily 
obtain certification and share customer· information in order to show that the 
institution is a "good citizen."96 That good citizen status could come in handy if the 
institution runs afoul of the arcane rules of money laundering and is faced with an 
enforcement action.97 Good citizen status could be especially important for 
financial institutions in light of the Patriot Act's so-called "sleeper provision" that 
will come to life when a financial institution seeks regulatory approval for 
expansion plans. The Patriot Act requires federal banking agencies to consider a 
financial institution's record of combating money laundering when reviewing 
applications in connection with a bank merger or acquisition.98 
What is left of financial privacy after these rules is an open question. It seems 
as though there is no meaningful financial privacy for a person suspected by a law 
enforcement official to be a money launderer. Nevertheless, the Treasury 
Department still officially gives lip service to the idea that citizens enjoy some 
measure of financial privacy. In testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of the 
Treasury, provided an example of the doublethink world we now inhabit when he 
stated that one of the administration's primary objectives in implementing the 
Patriot Act is the protection of consumer privacy.99 
93. See FinCEN website, http://www.fincen.gov/(lastvisitedDec.15. 2005} (providing access to 
the fonn a financial institution to submit their intention to engage in the sharing of infonnation with 
other financial institutions or associations of financial institutions). 
94. Id. 
95. Steve Cocheo, Dousing Terrorist Funding: Mission Possible?, ABA BANKING J., Aug., 2002, at 
39,44. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. USAPA § 327(b}(I}(B}, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c}(1l}. 
99. The Financial War on Terrorism and the Administration's Implementation of the Anti·Money 
Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Congo (2002) (statement of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary, 
U.S. Dept. of the Treasury), available at http://banking.senate.gov/02_01hrglOI2902/dam.htm (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2005) (noting that although "more than ever law enforcement and the intelligence 
community must have the ability to obtain and share financial infonnation ... that need must always be 
balanced against our fundamental notions of privacy"). 
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III. How THE PATRIOT ACT HAS BEEN USED 
As I and others have argued elsewhere, it is difficult to show that anti-money 
laundering laws are effective in preventing criminal activity.loo The scheme 
currently in place, however, will be extremely useful in building a routine criminal 
case against a routine criminal suspect. Now that the process is more of a two way 
street, the law enforcement community can get the suspect's financial records more 
easily. The section 314(a) process enables an investigator to canvass the nation's 
financial institutions for potential lead information that might otherwise never be 
uncovered. 
This mechanism will allow investigators to focus quickly on relevant locations 
and activities. This unprecedented cooperative effort between the financial 
community and law enforcement permits scattered bits of financial information to 
be identified, centralized, and evaluated. This innovation is great for law 
enforcement officials, but it should raise concerns for people who value privacy 
rights. 
The anti-money laundering provisions of Title III of the Patriot Act are not 
limited in their applicability to terrorism investigations. In one celebrated case, 
dubbed "Operation G-Sting," the anti-money laundering provisions of the Patriot 
Act were used to track the financial transactions of several parties allegedly 
involved in a scheme in which public officials accepted bribes and sold their votes 
in order to bend the rules for a Las Vegas strip club}OI Although the case clearly 
involved illegal activity, there was not even a whiff of terrorism involved. 
Nevertheless, the Patriot Act was used to make a case against the participants in a 
garden variety municipal corruption scheme. Supporters of the Patriot Act 
defended the use of the law in this context. They noted that nothing in the law 
limits its application to terrorist investigations, and they are absolutely right. 102 
The use of the anti-money laundering provisions in Operation G-Sting was not 
illegal, even if members of Congress who voted for the Patriot Act might be 
surprised that Title III applies to run-of-the-mill criminal activity. The availability 
of such a powerful tool for routine cases raises legitimate concerns for the defense 
bar, given the penchant for prosecutors to use allegations of money laundering to 
bolster their cases. Indeed, prosecutors have used money laundering violations as a 
100. See Gouvin, supra note 21, at 989 (arguing that using the money-laundering laws to shut down 
terrorism is extremely ambitious and may not be feasible); Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Tenuous 
Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 312 (2003) (stating that the fight against money laundering delivers 
less than it promises). 
101. See Steve Friess, Patriot Act Gets Mixed Reviews in Vegas, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8,2003, 
at A3 (asking if a law allegedly crafted to fight terrorism has been properly used to subpoena financial 
information in a public corruption case); John M Broder, A New Tale in Legalized Las Vegas Vice, THE 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,2003, at A24 (describing how the FBI used a provision of the Patriot Act to obtain 
financial records in a Las Vegas public corruption case); and John L. Smith, Corruption Probe Clearly 
Within Parameters of Patriot Act Foes, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 5, 2003, at IB (stating a similar 
proposition as the Broder article). 
102. See, e.g., Friess, supra note 101, at A3 (quoting Nevada Congressman Jim Gibbons asserting 
that the Patriot Act was designed not just to counter terrorism, but also to modernize and strengthen the 
F.B.I.). 
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device to leverage up the criminal consequences for regulated behavior, creating 
incentives for the accused to plea bargain. 
The poster boy for this problem is a Honduran lobsterman named David 
Henson McNab. McNab and three associates were convicted of violating the 
Lacey Act,103 which prohibits the importation of fish or wildlife caught or sold in 
violation of U.S. or "any foreign law."I04 A small percentage of the lobsters 
McNab imported into the United States were allegedly in violation of the lobster 
size regulations of Honduras and, in addition, the imported lobster was packed in 
plastic bags instead in cardboard boxes, another alleged violation of Honduran 
law.105 Because the proceeds from the sale of the illegal lobster were deposited in 
banks, McNab was also charged with money laundering. McNab was found guilty 
of, among other things, sixteen counts of money laundering. I06 He was sentenced 
to eight years in prison. 107 A petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United 
States Supreme Court.108 The McNab case illustrates how devastating the money 
laundering laws can be in the hands of the government. We ought to permit this 
power only when prosecutors and law enforcement agencies are subject to 
sufficient checks and balances to ensure that abuse of privacy and civil liberties 
will not occur. 
. Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act and the promulgation of the regulations 
implementing it, the only way for a law enforcement agency to get the actual 
financial records of a suspect was to obtain a subpoena. Today that is still 
technically true, but because of the regulations implementing section 314(a), law 
enforcement agencies know with great certainty where they should be looking and, 
even before they seek a subpoena, they know a great deal about the financial 
transactions of the subject. Nevertheless, it remains true that section 314(a) is 
supposed to provide lead information only and is not a substitute for a subpoena or 
other legal process. 
To obtain documents from a financial institution that has reported a match, a 
law enforcement agency must meet the legal standards that apply to the particular 
investigative tool that it chooses to use to obtain the documents. Although a grand 
jury subpoena is the normal mechanism, increasingly, the device used to obtain the 
records is an administrative subpoena. The due process safeguards for 
administrative subpoenas are modest at best. 
To appreciate how modest, it is worthwhile to contemplate how government 
requests for information fall into a general hierarchy. The various levels of the 
hierarchy provide various levels of protection for the party from whom information 
is sought. In addition, the person from whom the information is sought often has 
strategies for challenging the request or even avoiding compliance with it. At the 
103. 16 U.S.C.A. §3372 (2003). 
104. United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 122S, 1234 (l1th Cir. 2003). 
105. [d. at 1232-33. 
106. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Four Involved in Lobster Harvesting & Distribution Found 
Guilty in megal Import Scheme, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/prl2000/November/647enrd.htm (last visited Dec. 15,2005). 
107. Tony Mauro, Lawyers See Red Over Labster Case, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. IS, 2004, available at 
http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=107642S337070. 
lOS. Blandford v. U.S., 540 U.S. 1177 (2004). 
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highest level of due process protection are search warrants. The issuance of search 
warrants is governed by the Fourth Amendment,I09 Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41,110 and extensive case law. A search warrant may issue only after a 
judicial determination that probable cause exists. Once issued, the power to 
actually use the search warrant is within the exclusive power of a law enforcement 
officer and attorney for the government. III Search warrants go into effect 
immediately upon issuance. Although the issuance of a search warrant may be 
challenged, that challenge does not take place until after the warrant has been 
executed. 
The next device for compelling the production of information in the general 
hierarchy is the subpoena duces tecum. Although these subpoenas are issued 
through a court, the preparation and drafting is actually controlled by the 
prosecutor's office. They are issued in the name of the Grand Jury. Subpoenas 
duces tecum can require the production of almost any kind of information. They 
are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17,112 but there are virtually no 
Fourth Amendment protections in connection with the subpoena process. That 
being said, the effect of a grand jury subpoena is somewhat less dramatic than a 
search warrant. For example, a grand jury subpoena does not authorize law 
enforcement agents to enter the subject's premises to conduct interviews or obtain 
evidence. The subject of the grand jury subpoena ordinarily will be given some 
period of time to respond. 
Recipients of subpoenas have some avenues available to challenge the request. 
For example, if compliance with the subpoena would be oppressive or 
unreasonable, or if it would disclose privileged matters, the court supervising the 
grand jury may, upon motion, quash or modify the subpoena.ll3 In addition, a 
subpoena may be quashed for failing to identify the materials sought with sufficient 
clarity and specificity.114 These procedural safeguards give defendants and others 
involved in the investigative process some leverage to deal with law enforcement 
officials, although in practice most requests to quash a subpoena are unsuccessful. 
An even less formal method for compelling the production of information is 
the administrative subpoena issued by a federal or state government agency. An 
administrative subpoena may be issued without a court order or an independent 
determination of probable cause (i.e., it may be issued with significantly less 
justification than a search warrant). Indeed, the touchstone for the issuance of an 
administrative subpoena is merely that the "information sought is reasonably 
relevant" to the investigation. ll5 The administrative subpoena provides few 
109. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
1l0. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 41(b). 
llI. FED. R. CRIM. PRoc. 41 (b); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Witness Bardier, 486 F. Supp. 1203 
(D.Nev. 1980). 
112. FED. R. CRIM. PRoc. 17. 
113. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 17(c); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993, 846 
F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346, n.4 (1974). 
114. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 17(c); In re Subpoena to Testify before Grand Jury Numbered S286-4-7, 
630 F. Supp. 235, 237-238 (N.D. Ind. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 118 F.R.D. 558, 565-566 (D. 
Vt. 1987). 
115. In re Sealed Case (Administrative Subpoena), 42 F. 3d 1412, 1415 (U.S. App. D.C. 1994) 
Spring 2005] FINANCIAL PRIV ACY IN WAR ON TERROR 537 
procedural safeguards for the subject of the inquiry. The person receiving the 
administrative subpoena must respond unless he or she obtains a court order 
blocking enforcement. The grounds for opposing an administrative subpoena 
include: whether the administrative agency has statutory authority to issue a 
subpoena; whether the subpoena seeks privileged or protected material; and 
whether the subpoena is overbroad and unduly burdensome. In the context of 
subpoenas seeking financial records as part of a prosecutorial fishing expedition to 
find evidence that might uncover unknown illegal activities, an administrative 
subpoena may be challenged on the ground that its purposes are not sufficiently 
definite. 116 One safeguard provides that an administrative agency cannot enforce its 
own subpoena. If the subject of the subpoena refuses to comply, the agency must 
file an action with the court. Unjustified refusal to comply on the part of the 
subpoena's recipient, however, could result in the imposition of court sanctions, so 
usually moving to quash or limit the subpoena is the safer course. I 17 
Of course, the law enforcement agency needs a subpoena only if it plans to 
obtain the actual financial records. Financial records are not subject to a subpoena 
or search warrant requirement in connection with a section 314 request. The only 
real check on that administrative power, given that the targets of the section 314 
searches cannot be informed that their account information was provided to the 
requesting law enforcement agencies,118 is a self-imposed rule from FinCEN. This 
rule requires federal law enforcement to provide assurances that the request has 
been subject to appropriate scrutiny at the agency level and that the matter under 
investigation satisfies FinCEN's standards for processing a formal section 314(a) 
inquiry. To document the need for the section 314(a) request, FinCEN requires all 
requesters to submit a form certifying that the investigation is based on credible 
evidence of terrorist financing or money laundering. Of course, there are no parties 
in a credible position to challenge the certification. As noted, the real parties in 
interest-the individuals whose information is about to be divulged-are not 
informed, and by law cannot be informed, that the section 314(a) request affecting 
their accounts has been made. The financial institutions affected cannot afford to 
challenge every section 314 request, nor will they want to in light of the "good 
citizen" dynamic discussed earlier where institutions dare not be seen as 
unsupportive of vigorous anti-money laundering efforts. 
In part because of the heavy-handed overreaching of the McNab case, FinCEN 
(quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950». 
116. See id. at 1418 (holding that where the Office of Thrift Supervision issued an administrative 
subpoena in part to uncover "other wrongdoing, as yet unknown" the proffered purpose of the subpoena 
was too indefinite to permit the court to assess whether the infonnation requested met the standard of 
being "reasonably relevant"). 
117. To round out the typology of infonnation seeking devices, the next step in the hierarchy would 
be infonnal requests for infonnation. These requests have no real procedural aspect to them. In many 
cases, however, government investigators simply ask for infonnation on an infonnal basis and the 
person from whom the infonnation is requested mayor may not comply based on factors such as a 
willingness to be cooperative. For these infonnal requests there is no legal basis to compel compliance, 
but non-legal pressures may make some targets cooperate in order to avoid antagonizing officials. 
118. See supra note 93 (stating that financial institutions of which FinCEN makes infonnation 
requests may not disclose to anyone that FinCEN has requested infonnation). 
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now requires that the agencies requesting a section 314(a) search determine that the 
money laundering aspect of the case is significant. In order to guard against 
inappropriate requests, FinCEN requires documentation showing "the size or 
impact of the case, the seriousness of the underlying criminal activity, the 
importance of the case to a major agency program, and any other facts 
demonstrating its significance."119 In addition, FinCEN will no longer process a 
section 314(a) money laundering request in cases where available traditional means 
of investigation have not been exhausted. 120 These internal procedural changes, if 
adhered to, will help prevent abuses like those that occurred in the Operation G-
Sting and McNab cases. Relying on the agency itself to honor its own procedures 
is not usually how our system ensures that all citizens receive due process, but it is 
better than nothing. Yet without the possibility of an adversarial process whereby 
the affected party can challenge the use of the section 314(a) process, the threat of 
continued abuse remains very real. 
To date, the section 314(a) process has allowed law enforcement agencies to 
use legal processes to investigate many businesses and organizations, often 
ostensibly non-profit groups, which may be related to terrorist financing. 121 But the 
law has also been used far beyond terrorist-related investigations. According to 
FinCEN, section 314(a) requests have included: a Hawala operation, arms 
trafficking, alien smuggling, cigarette smuggling, investment fraud, an international 
criminal network, and drug trafficking. 122 
According to the "314(a) Fact Sheet" published by FinCEN, between February 
2003 and December 2004, the section 314(a) system processed 367 requests 
submitted by ten Federal Agencies conducting significant criminal investigations. 
Of those investigations, 132 cases involved terrorism or terrorist financing, while 
the remaining 235 cases (almost twice as many as the terror-related cases) involved 
"money laundering"-which could be almost anything as long as it involves the 
movement of funds tainted by criminal activity.123 FinCEN's official tally shows 
that to date the 314(a) searches have resulted in, among other things, the following: 
1,378 new accounts identified, eleven search warrants, 725 grand jury subpoenas, 
129 administrative subpoenas, summons or other legal process, nine arrests, and 
two indictments. 124 
From the point of view of the law enforcement community, the section 314(a) 
process is clearly a success. From the point of view of the individuals whose 
accounts were accessed, we cannot be so sure. For one thing, there is no way to 
know whose accounts have been affected and what the consequences of being the 
119. FinCEN's 314(a) Fact Sheet, supra note 83. 
120. [d. 
121. Comments of Alice Fisher, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Testimony before the House 
Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Mar. 11, 2003, 
available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/medialpdfJ031103af.pdf. 
122. FinCEN's 314(a) Fact Sheet, supra note 83. 
123. [d. FinCEN notes that there were 2,599 subjects of interest identified in the investigations and 
that financial institutions responded with 19,471 total subject matches: 18,550 positive and 921 
inconclusive. [d. 
124. [d. 
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subject of a section 314 request have been. One can imagine that in a world where 
financial institutions are being evaluated by their regulators based in part on how 
zealously the institution helps to combat money laundering, institutions may begin 
to treat customers in whom law enforcement agencies show an interest as persona 
non grata-even if the criminal investigation turns up no wrongdoing. The section 
314 process is especially pernicious because customers never know that their 
account information has been accessed, so they may suffer the consequences of a 
section 314 request and not be able to link the institution's actions to its existence. 
IV. WHAT'S NEXT? 
Proponents of financial privacy need to come to peace with the idea that Title 
III of the Patriot Act is here to stay and will not go away anytime soon. People 
who value financial privacy ought to start thinking about ways to ameliorate the 
loss of privacy brought about by the Patriot Act. 
One place to start is to recognize that we have based our due process 
protections around an adversarial system. We believe people looking out for their 
own interests is the best safeguard for political and legal rights. In the context of 
anti-money laundering law, however, there may be something to be said for not 
giving notice to the people whose account information is being accessed, as the real 
criminals being investigated may flee. Relying just on FinCEN alone to do the 
right thing, however, should give a civil libertarian pause. Perhaps as a 
compromise it would make sense for the law to place an organization outside of 
FinCEN into the mix to act as a proxy for the real parties in interest. 
We could change the law to enable Congress or the courts to play an oversight 
role to keep FinCEN on the straight and narrow. Judges would be appropriate in 
this oversight role, as they have to make decisions about investigations of criminal 
suspects all the time. The section 314 process could be changed to require that 
FinCEN make periodic reports to a designated judge in order to show that the 
imposed procedural safeguards are in fact being observed. Similarly, Congress, or 
an adjunct arm of Congress, such as the General Accounting Office, could provide 
the oversight necessary to ensure that the good intentions of FinCEN are translated 
into a process that really does respect suspects' financial privacy to the maximum 
degree. 
Another procedural change that might bring some solace to those who value 
financial privacy would be for Congress to implement a true sunset provision for 
the money laundering provisions of the Patriot Act. Indeed, some proponents of 
the Patriot Act's anti-money laundering provisions could maintain that the money 
laundering provisions were already subject to a "sunset clause. " Yet a closer 
examination of the so-called sunset provision, section 303,125 reveals that it is not a 
125. The provision, section 303 of the Patriot Act, states as follows: 
IN GENERAL-Effective on and after the first day of fiscal year 2005, the provisions of this 
title and the amendments made by this title shall terminate if the Congress enacts a joint 
resolution, the text after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That provisions of the 
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, and 
the amendments made thereby, shall no longer have the force of law." 
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sunset provision at all. As written, the law would have sunset only if it had been 
repealed. In a true sunset provision, the law ceases to have effect unless it is 
reauthorized. 126 But the money laundering provisions of the Patriot Act continued 
to have effect even after its "sunset" date because Congress did not pass a joint 
resolution to repeal the law. To call section 303 of the Patriot Act a "sunset" 
provision is an act of political cynicism of the deepest nature. 
In effect what this provision says is that in 2005 Congress could undo this Act 
by passing an appropriate bill. But of course Congress always has that power-this 
is no sunset provision at all. The sun will only set if Congress actually resolves to 
terminate the money laundering provisions. Given the political difficulty of 
opposing the Patriot Act generally and the money laundering rules in particular, 
this, not surprisingly, has not happened and will not happen. 
Finally, one way to correct some of the possible abuse of the process would be 
to at least inform customers after the fact, in searches that turn up no suspicious 
activity, that their records have been the subject of a section 314 request. As 
discussed above, in the current climate of fear, where financial institutions can be 
penalized by their regulators for being perceived as uncooperative in the war 
against terror, there may be incentives for financial institutions to cut off dealings 
with customers who are merely suspected of being involved in terrorism. Indeed, 
there may be pressures to engage in ethnic profiling to get rid of customers who are 
likely to be the subject of section 314(a) requests. Of course, this would be 
reprehensible, but we must guard against it, as stranger things have happened. 
CONCLUSION 
The anti-money laundering provisions in Title III of the Patriot Act shift the 
balance of power toward law enforcement in the long-running debate about how 
much financial privacy people are entitled to. By making the anti-money 
laundering scheme a "two way street" in which law enforcement both receives data 
from financial institutions and can direct financial institutions to report on specific 
suspects, the Patriot Act gives law enforcement agencies a powerful tool to build 
cases against both terrorists and run-of-the-mill criminals. The law has already 
been used in ways that come as a surprise to many people who thought the goal of 
the legislation was fighting terrorism. 
Although FinCEN promises to use the new powers only when law 
enforcement agencies certify the seriousness of the cases, the lack of adversarial 
proceedings where the real party in interest can stand up to fight for its position 
leaves a lot of room for concern. We will never know whether FinCEN does a 
USAPA §303. 
126. For an example of a true sunset provision, see section 224 of the Patriot Act, which reads as 
follows: 
(a) In General-Except as provided in subsection (b), this title and the amendments made 
by this title (other than sections 203(a) 203(c), 205, 208, 210, 211, 213, 216, 219, 221, 
and 222, and the amendments made by those sections) shall cease to have effect on 
December 31, 2005. 
USAPA § 224. 
Spring 2005] FINANCIAL PRIV ACY IN WAR ON TERROR 541 
great job or a poor job in respecting financial privacy. The process ought to be 
amended to provide some degree of oversight that is outside of the internal process 
FinCEN currently employs. 
